racy than are the conditions facing the late developers. As a result, the early developers are viewed as more likely to be democratic than are the more recent developers.
Many of the countries which are at the highest levels of economic development are also the nations which began to develop in the earliest historical periods. This raises the question of whether it is the historical timing or the level of development that is the primary determinant of political democracy. If the historical period of development has the dominant influence, the chances for political democracy would not improve with socioeconomic advances. The characteristics of the time at which a society began its development would fix the form of its political system. In contrast, if developmental factors are more important, the level of political democracy would not be fixed but would be associated with socioeconomic changes. This paper presents and tests several major hypotheses on the effects of the timing of development on democracy while controlling for the level of development.
EARLY AND LATE DEVELOPMENT EFFECTS
The time in world history when a country begins to develop will affect its social, economic and political systems (see, e.g., Black, 1966; Levy, 1966; Seers and Joy, 1970) . Britain, the first economy to "take-off" into rapid economic growth, altered the path of development for all the countries that were to follow it. It established a model of economic development that influenced France, Belgium, America and numerous other countries. As the number of successful economies grew, the pool of potential models for the industrial development of other countries grew. At the same time the relevance of the traditional development models became questionable. Part of the reason for the irrelevance is that the first developers were largely from a similar western cultural heritage. In contrast, the later developers represent a more heterogenous set of sociocultural systems, some of which are not easily malleable to the transformations required to begin and maintain economic development. It is an open question whether democratic forms of government are consistent with the diverse sociocultural systems of these countries.
In addition many of the late modernizers face greater strains in their societies than were present in the first developers. Part of this strain is caused by what is often called demonstration effects. That is, the latecomers are well aware of what goods economic development can bring to their society and at the same time they are aware of their own economic backwardness. Rather than having a population willing to save and invest for an unknown future there is a great deal of pressure in the late developers for immediate consumption and social welfare as is found in more mature economies. A political democracy allows these rising and often competing demands to impinge upon the political system while the developing country's economic system is not advanced enough to satisfy the demands. These pressures may lead to the collapse of democratic regimes and give rise to a more authoritarian government which may or may not be better able to meet the demands but will be more successful in suppressing the demands.
Further strain is placed on the developing societies as a result of their rapid increases in population. The rapid diffusion of public health programs and inexpensive "death-control" technology to many of the Third World nations, has led to tremendous drops in mortality (Davis, 1956; Gray, 1974) . The rapid declines in mortality have not been accompanied by proportional drops in fertility and the result has been unprecedented increases in population. The population increases have put more pressure on the resources of the societies to feed, clothe and house a substantial number of new individuals who will not contribute to the work force for years to come. Emigration, which might relieve some of the population pressure, is made nearly impossible by quotas and immigration restrictions that are found in both developed and developing countries (de Schweinitz, 1964) .
The population problem and the other strains associated with late development are believed to make it difficult for a democratic form of government to be effective in developing nations (de Schweinitz, 1964; Moore, 1966) . A democratic form of government is seen as a luxury that cannot be afforded by a nation struggling to overcome poverty and starvation. In addition the birth control policies, economic and social changes that are considered essential to development are viewed as nearly impossible to achieve within a democratic framework. Instead, an authoritarian government with a concentrated distribution of political power is seen as a likely and necessary response to the tensions of late development (Heilbroner, 1974). The earlier developers did not have to cope with the same strains that are faced by the latecomers. They could afford to develop with a more diffused distribution of political power.
The world system and dependency perspective on national development suggest some additional reasons why the early developers are more likely to be politically democratic than are the late developers. In this perspective the early developers such as the U.S., U.K., France, etc. are considered the "core" nations of the world system. Political democracy is viewed as a system established by the elites within the core nations to avoid massive conflict with the core nonelites (Wallerstein, 1977: 34) . The ideology of political freedom and democracy spread rapidly through the early developers and made authoritarian political control give way to more subtle economic forms of control.
In contrast, the late developers are viewed as the peripheral nations in the world system. Their underdeveloped status is seen as at least partially a consequence of the development of the core nations (see, e.g., Baran, 1956; Frank, 1973; Wallerstein, 1974; Chase-Dunn, 1975 The early developers provided not only a model of economic development (as described above) but also a model of political "development." Most of the early developers of Western Europe and North America evolved political systems that were more democratic' than that found in other countries. The democratic ideology which legitimizes the democratic political system has become an important component of the political culture of these nations. The ideal of "rule by the people" has moved beyond the borders of the early developers and has spread to all corners of the globe. "Participation in public affairs at the national level has widened: in one country after another the earlier dichotomy between rulers and ruled has become blurred" (Bendix, 1976:245) .
The democratic ideology has been spread by books, movies, radios, and other vehicles of cultural transmission. The education of many of the Third World elites in western universities or under western systems of education also contributed to the diffusion of the belief in popular sovereignty. Ironically, the often nondemocratic colonialism of western I The differences in political power between males, females, races, occupations, and educational groups are obvious reminders that the democratic ideal is far from being met in any country developed or not. powers served to spread the democratic ideal if not the practice.
Although the spread of the democratic ideology has been worldwide, institutionalizing the ideal has proved far more difficult as is exemplified by the alteration of democratic to authoritarian governments in some Third World nations. However, the spread of the ideal has put authoritarian governments in a defensive position. A concentrated distribution of power must be justified to the masses within a country as well as to world public opinion. This will exert pressure toward more rather than less democratic forms of governments in the late developers.
The above argument suggests a second hypothesis that makes a prediction contrary to Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2: Because of the diffusion of the democratic ideal over time, the later the time of development the more pressure toward adopting a democratic form of government.
In addition to these two general timing hypotheses, a number of more specific characteristics of early and late development have been hypothesized to affect political democracy. In the next two sections the effects on political democracy of a Protestant-based culture and the strength of the state are discussed.
PROTESTANT-BASED CULTURE
One specific characteristic of the early developers which has been hypothesized to facilitate the rise of democracy is the extent to which a culture is influenced by Protestantism. As argued above, the diffusion of the democratic ideology has been worldwide. However, democratic political systems have seemed to receive their greatest legitimation in Protestantbased cultural systems. Lenski and Lenski (1974:349) Hypothesis 3: The greater the extent to which a nation's culture is Protestant-based, the higher its level of political democracy.
STATE'S ROLE IN ECONOMIC SYSTEM
The state or government's control of the economic system was relatively minor in the early developers. Instead the means to attain economic advancement were open to private, entrepreneurial experimentation. The commercial class in the early developers was able to gain a status significantly independent of the agricultural elites (Moore, 1966) . The relative autonomy and freedom of the commercial class led to even greater economic growth. As Landes (1969:19) observes: those economies grew fastest that were freest. This is not to imply that state enterprise or control is intrinsically inferior to private enterprise; simply that, given the state of knowledge in pre-industrial Europe, the private sector was in a better position to judge economic opportunity and allocate resources efficiently. Thus, the early developers' push toward industrialization was engineered by private entrepreneurs with a minimum of state intervention.
Karl de Schweinitz (1964) argues that the advancements of the early developers generated by a relatively autonomous commercial class diminished the political power held by the traditional governing elite. The economic gains of the commercial class led to their demands and receipt of a larger share of political power. In short, the minimal role of government in the economic development of the early developers seemed favorable to the extension of democracy in the political sphere.
The close connection between political democracy and this capitalist form of development has been recognized at least since the writings of Adam Smith. The ideal of a competitive and free struggle for leadership in democracies is quite consistent with the ideal of competitive and free trading in a market economy. In the political sphere the vote may be considered analogous to the dollar as a purchasing unit that, instead of buying economic goods, is spent in the selection of the ruling elites. Schumpeter's (1950:285) quote of a successful politician illustrates this point: "What businessmen do not understand is that exactly as they are dealing in oil so I am dealing in votes."
The capitalist mode of development, which was characteristic of many of the early developers, plays a less important role in the late developers. In response to foreign economic and political penetration and/or to overcome economic stagnation, the government in many of the latecomers will often play a more active economic role than was true in the early developers (de Schweinitz, 1964; Rubinson, 1976) . The state may be the only domestic institution that can accumulate the great amount of capital that is required to stimulate development. The nationalization of industries, the imposition of quotas on imports, and the creation of programs to increase native production are all examples of the enlarged role that the late developers' governments play. According to de Schweinitz (1964:59-75) the state or government in the latecomers is also likely to play a bigger part in handling the discontent of labor that accompanies a higher level of economic development. In the early comers labor was able to organize largely independently of the state. In the process of organization and legitimation the laborers gradually were able to attain a greater amount of political power. The late developers, however, cannot afford to have the growth processes slowed down by the demands of labor. Karl de Schweinitz argues that the state tends to incorporate the labor unions into the government so that they do not have a chance for autonomous development. The close ties of labor organization and the state weakens the impetus toward a more diffused distribution of political power. Under these conditions the political elites will be able to maintain a concentrated distribution of power. Moore (1966) also argues that the state plays a much larger role in the development of the latecomers. He hypothesizes that with the change from the bourgeois revolutions of the early developers to the "revolutions from above" and the "peasant revolutions" of the latecomers, the chances for political democracy have been greatly diminished.
These arguments suggest that if a state or government exercises a great degree of control in the economic system this will lead to a more concentrated distribution of power in the political system. Hypothesis 4: The greater the state's control of the economic system, the lower the level of democracy in the political system.
MEASURES
A sample of 99 countries at widely varying levels of development is used for the empirical analysis. Because data for the state's control of the economic system are not available for Communist countries (except Yugoslavia) the sample omits these societies. The following measures are used to operationalize the theoretical concepts that are specified in Hypotheses 1-4.
Time of Development
The time in world history that a nation begins to develop is a rather complex con-cept. It is not the "time" per se that is important but the combination of variables characterizing a historical period. Hypothesis 1 represents the views of some theorists that the factors characterizing the historical periods of the earlier developers favored political democracy. These favorable factors have steadily deteriorated over time so that the later the development the more obstacles to democratic development. Hypothesis 2 supports the opposite generalization; the conditions for democracy have improved, the later the time of development. When measuring the time of development it is difficult, if not impossible, to single out a particular year that unambiguously marks a starting point in a nation's development. There is also the possibility that "breakdowns of modernization" may occur (Eisenstadt, 1964) . Regional differences in starting points of development within nations are also likely. For example, in the United States the East began a period of rapid growth before other regions of the country. However, there are clearly differences in the timing of development when contrasting the various nations of the world so that it is possible to derive approximate starting points.
For this research two measures of timing are used. The first is measured by Black (1966) as reported in Taylor and Hudson (1971) . It is the approximate year at which the consolidation of modernizing leadership occurs and is the first step in the development process.
The consolidation is marked by three characteristics: (1) the assertion of the determination to modernize; (2) an effective and decisive break with the institutions of an agrarian way of life; and (3) (Taylor and Hudson, 1972) . The utility of using energy consumption as an indicator of development is recognized by many social scientists. Work by Cottrell (1953; provides a multilinear theory of societal evolution based upon the role of energy. Within development theory, Levy (1966) has given the most attention to the importance of energy in the development process. In fact he defines development or modernization on the basis of the amount and uses of inanimate energy and tools.
The basic relationship that energy consumption has to development is also supported by empirical works. Darmstadter (1971) shows that there is a high correlation between per capita energy consumption and per capita GNP both crosssectionally and over time. The amount of industrial capital stocks that a country has is central to its industrialization process.
Frank (1959) , testing time-series data, finds a correlation of 0.989 between energy consumption and industrial stock for the U.S. and a similar correlation for the U.K.
Using energy consumption also avoids some of the exchange rate and comparability problems that arise in using GNP and GDP. In addition energy consumption is often available for a larger and more representative sample of countries than is GNP or GDP.
The In of energy consumption is used because there is empirical evidence that the relationship between development and democracy is curvilinear and can be best captured by a log transformation of energy consumption (Jackman, 1973) . In addition the transformation reduces the extreme skewness in the untransformed energy consumption variable. (1974; 1975) , are often still not much larger than 60 to 80 countries.
It is also desirable to have an index that is available for more than one time period. In a later section of this paper a panel analysis will be used necessitating an index that is available for two time periods so that changes in political democracy can be analyzed. This goal of having measures at two time points conflicts with the goal of having a number of countries at varying levels of development. Since a significant proportion of the LDCs became independent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, not many indicators for them will be available before this time period. Jackman (1975:86) claims that the failure to distinguish between stability and democracy has led to spurious findings in the study of political democracy's effects on economic equality.7 Spurious findings might also result in this research if one of these measures were used. This is because those countries that have been developing the longest are generally the most stable. A democracy measure incorporating stability in its construction would increase the chances of a positive relationship because of stability's positive association with the length of time a country has been developing. The confounding of stability and democracy in one index also complicates the study of changes in democracy. Although a country's level of democracy may change drastically over a five-or ten-year period (e.g., Brazil, 1960-65), an index aggregated over a ten-or twentyyear period may gloss over these changes.
Another variable that is related to political democracy, but can be conceptu- ally distinguished from it, is the percentage of the adult population voting. This indicator also has been used in a number of indices (e.g., Lerner, 1958; Smith, 1969; Jackman, 1975) . Although having democratic institutions has no meaning without some popular participation, the percentage of the population voting in an election may reflect factors other than the extent of political democracy. For example, Kornhauser (1959) and Huntington (1968) argue that mass participation is considered desirable in both democratic and authoritarian regimes and therefore, high voting participation can be found in either type of society. Some countries require participation of all voters in elections so that participation statistics reflect a legal requirement rather than how democratic the system is. In addition, low levels of participation may result from either apathy of the voters or satisfaction with the government so that participation is viewed as not necessary (Lipset, 1963) . A more pragmatic reason for not using participation statistics is that it is difficult if not impossible to get these statistics for a large number of LDCs and for more than one time period. A measure of the percentage of the population eligible to vote (the franchise) is a much better indicator of political democracy but an accurate measure of it is even more difficult to find than accurate participation statistics. These and other arguments (see May, 1973) suggest that using voting participation as an indicator of political democracy raises a number of difficulties.
Political democracy should also be distinguished from social democracy. A strong socialist or labor party in power may be crucial to reducing the inequalities in the distribution of social and economic goods, but such indicators of social democracy are analytically distinct from indicators of political democracy. "Political democracy is not a sufficient condition for the achievement of a more equal society. The crucial matter is what the mass electorate does with the franchise and other democratic procedures" (Hewitt, 1977: 451) . In fact the relationship between political and social democracy is the subject of considerable research (see, e.g., Jackman, 1975; Hewitt, 1977) . At this point it seems best to treat these two concepts separately.
Because Hypothesis 1 predicts that b2 will be positive and significant; that is, the longer a country has been developing the greater its level of democracy. Hypothesis 2 suggests that b2 will be negative and significant, so that the late developers are more likely to be democratic. The timing of development is correlated with the level of development (r = 0.76). This regression allows us to evaluate the general timing hypotheses compared with the effects of development. If the timing of development is more important than the level of development, the standardized regression coefficient for the timing variable should be greater than that for the level of development. If the level of development is more important, the opposite should be found.
The regression results are reported in Table 1 . The coefficient for the timing of development variable (b2) is positive as predicted by the first hypothesis but is not significantly different from zero.10 In contrast, the coefficient for the level of development (b,) is positive and highly significant (p < 0.01). This suggests that the overall effect of timing is not strongly positive or negative. The level of development is far more important in determining whether a country is democratic or not.
Since there is a moderately high correlation between the timing of development and the level of development, it is possible that multicollinearity is affecting the results. Multicollinearity refers to the interdependency of the independent variables in a regression analysis. When the interdependency is great, it is difficult to separate the unique effects of each collinear variable. As a result, the estimates of the regression coefficients are likely to have large standard errors and are particularly susceptible to the effects of sampling fluctuations.
In Table 1 , the timing of development, but not the development level, has a large standard error relative to the magnitude of its regression coefficient. Since there are only two independent variables in the regression (excluding the constant), the degree of collinearity for each variable is identical. If the correlation between these variables is the only factor leading to the nonsignificance of development timing, then the level of development should also have a large standard error, which it does not. However, it is possible that the particular sample configuration used resulted in the level of development being signifi-'0 There was some concern that the U.K., which began to develop long before any other country, might act as an outlier having a disproportionate effect on the estimate of the regression coefficients. To investigate this possibility, I reran the regression omitting the U.K. The regression estimates were not significantly different. As a further check on the possible impact of this type of outlier the democracy index was regressed on the natural log of the time of development. Again, no significant differences resulted. In this case it made the most sense to use the unlogged time of development variable including the U.K. cant. Indeed if multicollinearity is a serious problem in this regression, a change in the sample should lead to very different results.
To test this possibility, I selected a random subsample of the full 99 cases and reran the regression." The results were the same: the level of development was significant and development timing was not. Two additional random subsamples were analyzed with the same conclusion.
As an additional test of the general timing hypothesis another regression was run including the Rostow The results are reported in Table 2 . As was found with Black's measure, the coefficient for the Rostow-Collier's takeoff date is not significantly different from zero and the coefficient for development is positive and significant. Based on these consistent results across samples and measures of development timing, it is unlikely that multicollinearity can explain these findings.
The nonsignificant impact of the timing of development on political democracy does not rule out the possibility that more specific characteristics of development timing may affect democracy. As one possibility, Hypothesis 3 predicts that the greater extent to which a culture is Protestant-based, the more likely it is to be democratic. Hypothesis 4 suggests that a high degree of state controlled economic activity lessens the chances for political democracy. These two more specific hy- " To select the random subsample, I assigned all countries a random number from a uniform distribution between zero and one. Those cases with a random number greater than 0.5 were analyzed. 0.56). However, both the percentage of the population that is Protestant and the state's economic strength measure have significant coefficients (p < .05) in the predicted direction. That is, the greater the proportion of the population that is Protestant, the higher the level of democracy, and the greater the proportion of GDP consumed by the government the less the level of democracy.'2 This equation also was estimated including Black's timing of development. The timing of development variable was still found to be insignificant as in Table 1 Pelz and Lew (1970) suggest that the true effects of variables in a panel design may be exaggerated if too long a lag is chosen. However, there was some concern that the short lag involved in the estimation may have biased the results against finding stronger effects of Protestantism and the state's control of the economy. For this reason a ten-year lag model also was estimated. In the 49 countries for which data were available, the estimated coefficients for percent Protestant and state's economic control were even less significant than those reported in Table 4 . However, if more data becomes available, further research on the lag would be worthwhile.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
A number of social scientists have expressed considerable pessimism about the chances for political democracy in the late developers. The strains under which the latecomers must industrialize are viewed as something best handled by authoritarian governments. On the other hand, another perspective argues that with the diffusion of the democratic ideology over time, the latecomers increasingly will be under pressure to adopt more rather than less democratic forms of government. My research lends no support to either of these generalizations.
However, when more specific characteristics associated with development timing are examined, some significant effects are found. In the cases explored here, I have found support for the hypotheses that the greater the extent to which a culture is Protestant-based the greater the level of political democracy, and the greater the government's control of the economic system the lower the level of democracy.
In a panel analysis of changes in political democracy, the state's control of the economic system had negative effects as found in the "cross-sectional" regressions. Protestantism, however, did not appear to have any significant impact. In all of the regressions the most significant variable is the level of development. These results indicate that the level of development is a more important explanatory variable than the timing variables. However, a note of caution must be made in interpreting the null effect of the general timing variable. Although my results do not support the generalizations that conditions have become progressively worse or better for political democracy, these findings do not rule out the possibility that some of the more specific characteristics, such as differing cultural systems and economic dependency, have an effect. It is possible that the null effect of the time of development represents a "balancing out" of these positive and negative, more specific characteristics. In failing to find a general timing effect, this research has performed only a first step. Future research in this area should concentrate on mated coefficients for development (energy consumption per capita), Protestantism, and state's economic control (6b, b3, and b4, respectively) will be underestimates of the true effects. Unfortunately, the simple panel design used here does not lend itself to the traditional tests of autocorrelation (e.g., Durbin-Watson test). For a more extensive discussion of panel estimation see Hannan and Young (1977) . other specific timing variables (e.g., political instability, dependency, and rates of development) that may affect democracy and should compare their effects with development. All six components were scored so that they ranged from zero to 100 with 100 indicating a high level of political democracy. Any country which had more than three of the six components missing were dropped. Values were estimated for nations having three or less missing components. Less than 10%o of the variables needed to construct the index were estimated. The correlation matrix between the six components for 1960 is presented in Table Al. 
